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The Massachusetts Antiwar Bill, by Anthony A. D'Amato,*
42 New York State Bar Journal 639-649 (1970)
Abstract: The Massachusetts Antiwar bill provides that no inhabitant of Massachusetts inducted into or serving
in the armed forces “shall be required to serve” abroad in an armed hostility that has not been declared a war by
Congress under Art. I, Sect. 8 of the United States Constitution. One could hardly imagine a more fundamental
constitutional doubt arising in the mind of the American public than that of the legality of a major war. The
purpose of the Massachusetts bill is purely and simply to obtain an authoritative judicial test of the
constitutionality of an undeclared war.
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[pg639]** One of the most singular pieces of legislation in American constitutional
history passed both houses of the Massachusetts legislature on April 1st, 1970, and was signed
into law, effective immediately, on the following day by Governor Francis W. Sargent. It
provides that no inhabitant of Massachusetts inducted into or serving in the armed forces “shall
be required to serve” abroad in an armed hostility that has not been declared a war by Congress
under Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution. Exceptions are made for an
“emergency” or when the President is acting as Commander-in-Chief. A further provision of
the bill orders the state Attorney General to bring appropriate legal action on behalf of
Massachusetts servicemen who are required to serve abroad in an undeclared war, and in
addition on behalf of the Commonwealth itself. All servicemen notifying the Attorney General
under this bill are to be joined as parties in the legal action. The Attorney General is directed to
bring action directly in the Supreme Court as a matter of original jurisdiction, but should this
fail, to bring another such action in an inferior federal court.
The bill is not “absurd”FN1 nor an April Fool's joke as some have tried to contend.
Debate in the Massachusetts legislature, where the bill passed in the Senate 29 to 3 and in the
House by a vote of 127-97, was deadly serious. It focused upon the immense cost to the
American economy and the morale of American youth of the undeclared war in Vietnam and
justified the bill as an attempt to secure Supreme Court adjudication of the legality of unilateral
executive action which got this country entangled in Vietnam in the first place. At the present
writing similar or identical bills to the Massachusetts statute are in the process of being
introduced into the legislatures of Illinois, Ohio, Maine, New York, Rhode Island, and
California. And Massachusetts in July 1970 filed an original action in the Supreme Court to
test the constitutionality of the Vietnam War in a case entitled Massachusetts v. Laird.
In months to come lawyers and bar associations will be called upon to comment upon,
or perhaps sponsor, similar bills in these and other states. The public and their elected
representatives will want to know answers to questions such as the following:
(1) Is it constitutional for a state to pass such a bill?
(2) Doesn't the bill “interpose” the state against the federal government?
(3) What is the purpose of the bill?
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(4) Wouldn't the bill hamstring the President?
(5) What will the Supreme Court decide?
Of course these questions cannot be answered definitively, but opinion [pg640] can
and should be given by lawyers because the problem is preeminently a legal one. I shall try to
indicate briefly some of the factors that could go into one's answer to the preceding questions.
Constitutionality of the Bill
Many states have enacted statutes that were later found to conflict with federal laws and
were thus struck down by federal courts. There is nothing “unconstitutional” about a state
passing a law which is later determined in federal court to conflict with a valid federal law. The
purpose of the Massachusetts Antiwar Bill is precisely to get judicial review, eventually by the
Supreme Court, on its constitutionality. If the Supreme Court determines that the various
Selective Service and other federal laws relating to Vietnam are constitutional despite the lack
of a Congressional declaration of war for Vietnam, then of course the Massachusetts statute will
become null and void. On the other hand, as we shall see below, there is a very significant
chance that the Massachusetts act itself would prevail over all the federal laws because the
latter will be held to be invalid on the basis that an undeclared war is an unconstitutional war.
Nor can the bill interrupt the present war effort. Any serviceman, under the pain of
court-martial, has to accept all orders, including orders to serve in Vietnam. If he refuses to
serve, and is court-martialled, his defense may be that the Vietnam War and orders pertaining
thereto are illegal because Congress never formally declared war as required by the
Constitution. This procedure has always been available to servicemen in defense of courtmartial; the Massachusetts statute does not help the serviceman-defendant in this regard in any
way except for providing, at the state's expense, the services of the Attorney General. An
innovation that the statute does provide is that a serviceman can bring an affirmative action (in
advance of having to refuse a received order) invoking the Massachusetts act in a claim that the
Vietnam war is unconstitutional. But when his case is pending, such a serviceman will have to
continue to obey his orders, again under pain of courtmartial. As Governor Sargent of
Massachusetts said to the press upon signing the act, “Massachusetts servicemen should realize
the bill's enactment provides no license for them to disobey lawful orders received from
military authorities.” Indeed the bill does not place a serviceman in a dilemma, as it might had
it contained wording prohibiting him from serving in an undeclared war. Instead the act simply
says that he shall not be “required” to serve. Thus a serviceman cannot violate the
Massachusetts act if he chooses to serve, but he can invoke the act and its services of the
Attorney General if he chooses to contest the legality of the war.
The Interposition Argument
The foregoing makes it plain that the old doctrines of “interposition” and “nullification”
do not apply in the present case. Recently the Supreme Court approved a three-judge District
Court definition of “interposition” as
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an amorphous concept based on the proposition that the United States is a compact of
states, any one of which may interpose its sovereignty against the enforcement within its
borders of any decision of the Supreme Court or act of Congress, irrespective of the fact
that [pg641] the constitutionality of the act has been established by decision of the
Supreme Court.FN2
Obviously the proposed bill is not in defiance or any decision of the Supreme Court.
Rather, it is an attempt to get a decision. No question of interposition or nullification can arise
at this stage which is in advance of a determination by the Supreme Court as to the legality
of an undeclared war.
Purpose

The purpose of the Massachusetts bill is purely and simply to obtain an authoritative
judicial test of the constitutionality of an undeclared war. Earlier I said that a serviceman could
raise this issue in defense to his refusal to obey an order to serve in Vietnam. Indeed, servicemen and inductees have raised the issue in a number of cases. But lower federal courts and
military tribunals have uniformly dismissed such pleas on the ground that they are not
justiciable, that they raise political questions. The Massachusetts statute, by throwing the
weight of the state behind the serviceman, attempts to lower the justiciability barrier. It invokes
the authority of the state, of the attorney general, and of the entire class of servicemen of that
state who are similarly affected.
Of course, one might ask whether a genuine “political question” that is not adjudicable
by a court should become any less so simply because a state has, in a sense, dramatized the
issue. In reply it may not be unfair to say that lower federal courts and military tribunals have
not justified their invocation of the “political question” doctrine in refusing to hear pleas of the
unconstitutionality of an undeclared war on any theory of “political questions.” In the light of
recent decisions by the Supreme CourtFN3 there would appear to be no basis upon which a
court could deny to review the issue of the constitutionality of an undeclared war on any theory
of “political questions.” In a 1958 case the Supreme Court scrutinized very carefully an alleged
congressional delegation to the executive of power to control passports,FN4 without raising the
political question barrier. If that case did not involve a political question where there was
nothing specific in the Constitution giving Congress a power in the first instance over pass
ports, then a fortiori there should be no political question on the issue of an undeclared war
when the Constitution in Article I Section 8 states that ''The Congress shall have Power ... to
declare war.” Our conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the Supreme Court has not invoked
the “political question” ground in Vietnam cases even though lower courts disposed of these
cases on that ground. Instead, the Court has relied solely upon its discretionary power to
deny certiorari to such cases.
While not technically a “political question,” the plea of unconstitutionality of an
undeclared war certainly raises a large “political” issue. It is possible that the Supreme Court
might feel a sort of political embarrassment in handling such a case. Yet this is not a legally
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articulable standard for denying review, particularly when the lives of individuals are at stake.
Indeed, letting such cases [pg642] stand on lower court determinations of “political questions”
may be in a basic sense the denial of due process of law to servicemen who are claiming that
a court must review all relevant legal issues when their lives or liberties are at stake. Moreover,
one might argue that a Court should not concern itself with political embarrassment since
judges are appointed for life for the very purpose of ensuring their political independence.
Finally, even eminent justices can be quite wrong about entering into the “political thicket.”
When the Supreme Court in 1962 faced up to the constitutional issue of gerrymandered
political districts, a milestone was achieved. Subsequent years have not at all substantiated the
dire warnings of Justice Frankfurter that for the Court to deal with what he considered a clear
instance of a “political question” would engender abuse and disrespect for the Court and a
diminution of its authority in all other aspects of its work.FN5 Instead the Court has been
greatly strengthened by its entry into the gerrymandered “political thicket.”
At the Supreme Court level, as I have said, the Court has declined to hear Vietnam cases
in the exercise of its discretionary power of certiorari. Yet the Court's own Rules indicate that
review on certiorari depends largely on the case raising an “important question” or a
“question of substance”.FN6 The Supreme Court has not given a single reason in justification
of its repeated refusal to grant certiorari to cases involving the Vietnam issue. As Justice
Stewart said in a long and unusual dissent to the denial of certiorari in one of these cases, “We
cannot make these problems [of the constitutionality of the Vietnam war] go away simply by
refusing to hear the case of three obscure Army privates.”FN7 Massachusetts clearly agrees
with Justice Stewart. It obviously cannot tell the Supreme Court what to decide (though
Massachusetts has its own opinion, expressed in its statute) but it feels it has the right to ensure
that the Supreme Court handles the case. It will naturally abide by the Supreme Court’s
decision. But at least, when that happens, the Constitution will have had its day in court.
Will the President Be Shackled?
Since 1945 we have heard many arguments to the effect that the President must be able
to act quickly and decisively in the area of foreign relations, and that slow Congressional
deliberation was possible only in former, unhurried times. Would the Massachusetts bill result
in a shackling of presidential leadership and initiative?
In the first place, the bill recognizes an exception for “emergencies” or for presidential
action as commander-inchief. Surely if the United States were territorially attacked the
President would respond without first checking with Congress. World War III, it has been said,
could begin and end within a half hour. But the concept of an armed attack on territorial United
States should not blind us to the long range of other possibilities, of which, perhaps, Vietnam is
the opposite extreme. It took this country approximately a decade after 1954 of gradually
increasing involvement in Vietnam before the public perceived that a full-scale war was going
on.[pg643] Surely this fact alone indicates that the war was no immediate threat to our territory
or national security, that it did not call for rapid executive reaction, and that Congress had
plenty of time for full deliberation. Vietnam, indeed, may be the classic case of a situation
where the Constitutional requirement of a declaration of war literally applies and is completely
appropriate.
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On a more fundamental level, it is arguable that the war in Vietnam cogently
demonstrates the folly of departing from Constitutional imperatives.
The war in Vietnam may ultimately prove to be second on to World War II in terms of
expense to the United States. The dollar cost of the war, including post-war veterans' benefits
and interest on the war debt, may finally exceed 350 billion dollars. At home the war has
triggered an inflation, increased interest rates to unprecedented levels, forced domestic reform
and rehabilitation into the back seat, and caused widespread youthful alienation from the
orderly processes of social institutions. It has resulted in over 40,000 death in battle of
American youths, and perhaps another 10,000 related non-combat deaths. Both in
psychological and in economic terms, the war has been an extraordinary burden.
If the aims of the Vietnam war were of vital importance to national security, the price
paid for the war would have been accepted by the American people. But national leaders have
been visibly unable to persuade the American people that our efforts in Vietnam, supporting a
dictatorial and repressive regime in Saigon against the wishes of most of the people of that
unfortunate land, are at all worthwhile. Indeed, our leaders have long since given up attempts at
persuasion, and are now talking simply in terms of avoiding American embarrassment by
pulling out too abruptly. At the same time, however, the American public is witnessing an
ironic replay of the early 1960's when step by step American military forces were getting
enmeshed in Vietnam. Only today we are seeing it in Laos and in Cambodia. At the same
time that our leaders are talking of withdrawing from Vietnam, there is a gradual escalation of
American military activity in Laos and in Cambodia, and who knows that further efforts be
made in countries such as Thailand or Indonesia.
The Laotian and Cambodian fronts today bear a great resemblance to the Vietnam
pattern of the early 1960's. Then, as well as now, the executive branch of the American
government conducted its activities as secretly as possible, without mentioning them either
to Congress or to the press except when forced to as the result of journalistic leaks. Then, as
well as now, we were told that the military advisers to the President had secret, classified
information the nature of which fully justified the military activities but which could not be
revealed publicly.
The growing public disenchantment with the war in Vietnam in the last half of the
1960’s, however, led to progressive revelations concerning the secrets known in the early
1960's only to the President and his top military advisers. The State Department, and then the
Pentagon, and finally the President and his closest advisers, progressively “leaked” the truth to
the American public in a series of white papers, speeches, reports, and testimony to
Congressional committees. They did so because they were placed on the defensive, attempting
to justify and rationalize our involvement [pg644] in Vietnam. However, as these secrets were
unravelled, it became painfully obvious that they were in many cases based on false or mis
leading information, that they were internally inconsistent, and that they were premised upon
unfounded hunches that were dubious at the time they were made and clearly absurd in
retrospect.FN8 More and more well-informed leaders of American opinion are reaching the
conclusion that there was no rational basis for our involvement in Vietnam in the first place,
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and that this is the real tragedy. On top of this, the bitter irony of history now suggests that we
are witnessing the beginning of two more “Vietnams”—in Laos and in Cambodia—for the
same non-reasons that prevailed when we slipped surreptitiously into Vietnam in the year
following the French pull-out in 1954.
This recent history confirms an ancient tale—that executive-military leaders tend to
embroil their nations into wars for bad or nonexistent reasons, and that it is a danger to a nation
to entrust basic war-peace decisions to decision-makers who do not have to justify their
actions upon a rational basis to representatives of the people. This is true irrespective of the
party affiliations or personal ideologies of the executive-military leaders. The framers of our
Constitution, mindful of the war-making activities of English and continental monarchs in the
sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, wrote into the Constitution the requirement that
only Congress has the power to declare war, and to raise and support armies and navies. No
less an authority than President Lincoln said on this point :
The provision of the Constitution giving warmaking power to Congress was dictated, as
I understand it, by the following reasons: Kings had always been involving and
impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of
the people was the object. This our convention understood to be the most oppressive of
all kingly oppressions, and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man
should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us.FN9
It is the Constitutional requirement of Congressional declaration of war which the Illinois bill
and the Massachusetts statute seek to enforce in the teeth of unilateral executive decision
making for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
What the Supreme Court Might Do
The Massachusetts antiwar bill is premised upon a conviction that there exists a prima
facie case that the Vietnam war is unconstitutional because Congress has not made a declaration
of war as required by Article I Section 8 of the Constitution. How the Supreme Court will
decide this case on the merits is, of course, unknowable. To some extent the Justices, as human
beings, will ask themselves what the effect will be upon public respect for law and for the
judiciary if, at this late hour, the Court were to hold that the war violates the Constitution.
Would such a ruling lead to cynicism on the part of the public that the Court did not decide
much earlier such a basic question? Or, on the contrary, would such a decision by the Court
strengthen [pg645] the respect for the rule of law in this nation on the basis that the public
already believes that the plain words of the Constitution have been, and are being, violated in
the case of Vietnam? We cannot answer these questions in advance, but we can be sure of at
least one thing: that the very passage of the antiwar bill by Massachusetts, and its consideration
and perhaps passage in other states as well, itself is a new factor in the Court's calculus of
public reactions and expectations. For if a populous state of this nation actually passes
legislation calling for a judicial determination of the constitutionality of the war, then that is
significant data that the public questions the legal basis of the war. In such a situation, the most
conservative course for the Court to follow—assuming that the Court is influenced in part by
such considerations—would be to strengthen the public's respect for the rule of law indicated
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by the Massachusetts act, by applying the rule of law against the massive executivemilitary
decision-making process that led to Vietnam. The Court can affirm the fact that we are a nation
of laws, not of presidents.
Apart from motivation, what are the legal considerations, in brief, that would enter
into a Supreme Court determination of the issue? The most important has already been
mentioned: the precise words of the Constitution of Article I, Section 8, Paragraph 11, granting
to Congress the power to declare war. There have been many cases in constitutional law where
counsel have attempted to read into the words of the Constitution a reasonable exception, only
to be met by a Supreme Court ruling that where the Constitution is clear no amount of argument
can change the meaning of plain words.FN10 Although ingenious arguments can, and have,
been raised to the effect that there has been Congressional approval of the Vietnam war, or that
the war is an exception to Congressional power to declare war, the plain fact is that the words
of the Constitution arc clear and unexceptional.
One argument that has been made points to the vast expenditures by Congress in
support of a military budget that was clearly designated for Vietnam. However, this is not the
same thing as declaration of war. If it were, then the Constitution would not have given to
Congress the power to declare war in addition to the other Article I powers to raise and support
Armies and to provide and maintain a Navy. Moreover, it is difficult for Congress not to give
needed support in terms of food and ammunition to troops already in the field in Vietnam, and
in this sense a Congressional appropriation to back up the President's action is not the political
or legal equivalent of a decision by Congress in the first place to declare a state of war.
Counsel for the President have claimed that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of August
10, 1964, was the “functional equivalent” of a Congressional declaration of war.FN11 This, of
course, presents a question that can only be resolved by the Supreme Court. The Court might
determine that Congress did not intend the [pg646] Resolution, occasioned by a claimed, and
later disputed, attack on two American destroyers, to be a declaration of war. Additionally, the
Court might determine that the Resolution cannot be construed to be a valid delegation of the
power to make war to the President, since the Constitution gives the war-declaring power only
to Congress. We cannot tell in advance what the Court might decide on this issue, and there is
no point in repeating arguments that have been fully aired in the law reviews.FN12 The
important fact is that there is a good chance that the Court will come down on the side of
Massachusetts.
Finally, the same conclusion should be drawn from the arguments that the American
involvement in Vietnam is constitutional because it is the result of our SEATO treaty
commitments. A treaty, however, is not passed upon by Congress as a whole but only by the
Senate, and thus it cannot be the functional equivalent of a declaration of war. Indeed, the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty itself recognizes this by stating in its operative article
that each Party, to meet the common danger, will act “in accordance with its constitutional
processes.”FN13 Presumably these “constitutional processes” would have to include a
Congressional declaration of war, for as the Supreme Court held in Reid v. Covert,FN14 the
United States can only act according to the Constitution even if a treaty entered into by the
United States purported to indicate otherwise. Indeed, this insistence in Reid v. Covert
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upon constitutionality in the area of foreign relations, cutting back upon some of the more
extravagant dicta in the earlier Curtiss-Wright Case,FN15 indicates that the Supreme Court in
recent years has been more concerned than ever to insist upon precise conformity to the careful
words of the Constitution.
Other Legal Questions
The questions dealt with so far have been designed to highlight the chief aspects of
public and political concern with the Massachusetts antiwar bill. But when debate on this
matter becomes more intricate, with the help of legal counsel, two other important problems
can arise: the relevance of the “Prize Cases” and the issue of “standing”. Let us examine these
briefly.
Although there is no exact precedent for the constitutional issue before us concerning
the validity of an undeclared war, some persons have contended that the Prize Cases,FN16 are
in point. The Court in 1863 was faced with the question of the validity of President Lincoln's
seizure of ships carrying goods to the Confederate States when there was no Congressional
declaration of war. Under the international law of the day, applicable in American courts, the
right of prize and capture depended upon the validity of a blockage which in turn depended
upon the existence of a de facto war. The question then was: was this a “war” for these
purposes. Although the Court answered in the affirmative, it did not go on to say that the
undeclared civil war was a “war” for the purposes of internal American constitutional law. In
other words, the existence a de [pg647] facto war for validating a blockade did not depend upon
a Congressional declaration that a war existed. (A present-day analogue might be a
determination that a state of war existed during the Korean conflict for the purpose of
construing insurance claims even though there was no Congressional declaration of war).FN17
In reaching its conclusion in the Prize Cases, the Supreme Court had to deal with the
arguments of counsel that if there was a war for international law purposes, then Congress
surely would have declared one as well. The Court answered this by pointing out that “a civil
war is never publicly proclaimed.” Indeed, Congress never did declare war against the
Confederacy, though it had many occasions to do so and though it explicitly validated whatever
President Lincoln requested by way of power to conduct the military effort. Rather, the
understanding was that the Confederacy was engaged in an insurrection, not a war. As the
Supreme Court stated,FN18 “By the Constitution, Congress alone has the power to declare a
national or foreign war. It cannot declare war against a State, or any number of States, by virtue
of any clause in the Constitution.”
We thus see that by its very terms the Prize Cases could only apply to a civil
insurrection within the United States, and that its language authorizing President Lincoln's
seizure of the ships cannot be applied to a “national or foreign war.” The Cases therefore are
totally irrelevant to the presently proposed bill which deals with armed hostilities outside the
territorial limits of the United States.
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The question of standing in court to challenge the constitutionality of the President's
actions requiring a serviceman to serve in an undeclared war is not as important a question as it
may have been prior to recent Supreme Court decisions of 1968 and 1970.FN19 These cases
have liberalized the “standing” requirements, requiring only that the plaintiff demonstrate a
threatened injury in fact, and that his interest is arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the constitutional guarantee in question. Under these requirements an
affirmative allegation that being forced to participate in an undeclared and hence
unconstitutional war substantially threatens the life and health of the plaintiff should clearly
merit a finding of standing in a federal court. Nevertheless, there may still lurk in the
“standing” rules an element of “self-restraint” for the Supreme Court's “own governance.”FN20
Here the Massachusetts statute does two important things to help ensure standing:
(a) The act makes the Commonwealth an actual party in interest. It will attempt to sue
(in the Supreme Court directly, if possible under the “original jurisdiction” rules, but in any
event in a lower court) to defend and enforce the rights of its own inhabitants. The Attorney
General will probably allege that the State itself suffers if some of its inhabitants are killed in a
foreign war. Such an argument at least avoids the disability in Massachusetts v. Mellon,FN21
[pg648] where the State was held to have no interest in light of the fact that the real plaintiff,
Mrs. Frothingham, had no standing and that the state itself was not compelled to do anything. It
builds instead on the precedents of Georgia v. Penn. R. Co.,FN22 and South Carolina v.
Katzenbach,FN23 which both allowed original jurisdiction for the plaintiff states.
(b) The proposed bill essentially makes a class action of the individual serviceman's
case. By joining as parties a large number of servicemen who are all asserting the same claim,
the old Frothingham v. MellonFN24 result might be avoided even if Frothingham has any
validity after the recent standing cases. The Frothingham case stressed the fact that the plaintiff
was asserting that she suffered something in an indefinite way in common with people
generally. This notion—that there must be some discrete individuality to a case—lurks in the
background of much of the older thinking about standing and justiciability. It is countered by
adding to the number of plaintiffs, so that the litigants in court actually represent a substantial
portion of the total class of persons similarly affected. The proposed bill extends such a class to
the entire state of Massachusetts.
Conclusion
No other court, at home or abroad, can claim as much power as the United States
Supreme Court. In its earliest days it successfully arrogated to itself the power to make
definitive interpretations of the Constitution. The American people have become accustomed to
Constitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court, and expect it whenever an important issue
presents itself. Thus the Court has inherited a responsibility , as well as a power—the
responsibility to make final constitutional determinations when basic challenges to legality
arise.
One could hardly imagine a more fundamental constitutional doubt arising in the mind
of the American public than that of the legality of a major war. The Supreme Court has ducked
this issue so far, but now Massachusetts—in its revolutionary tradition of two centuries ago—is
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leading the way for confrontation of the issue, The Supreme Court should, and must, accept the
issue for adjudication and deliver a reasoned opinion. In a way, doing so would be more
important for the ideal of the rule of law in this nation then even what the disposition of the
case will be on the merits. The Court will fulfill a historic role as a teacher for the American
public by handing down a reasoned decision as to the legality under the Constitution of an
undeclared war.
In this day when the concept of “law and order” has a hollow ring in the minds of many
of the youth of this nation, largely because of Vietnam,FN25 it is vital for the executive branch
of our government to behave strictly according to the letter of the law and the Constitution.
When a substantial doubt arises as to the legality of executive action, the President should
indeed welcome a [pg649] definitive interpretation from the Supreme Court. But even if the
President fears such a resolution of the issue, the Supreme Court should take the longer view
required by the ideal of a government under law and take on the case.
If the courts holds that the undeclared war in Vietnam is constitutional, most doubts on
this particular issue will be allayed and public confidence will be restored. If the Court holds
the other way, the President will have no choice but to dismantle forthwith the military effort in
Southeast Asia, unless Congress passes a formal declaration of war. If he has to dismantle the
military effort, the President can persuasively claim that he is doing his duty under law even
though he personally would have not done so had he not been legally compelled. There can be
no embarrassment for a statesman in such a position. On either alternative, the Chief Executive
can only gain in stature and in respect.
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